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International Responsibility of Business for Violation 
of Human Rights – Customers’ Perspective1
Abstract: Th is paper deals with possible avenues for enforcement liability of human rights violations 
that occur in less industrially developed countries. Since food, clothing and other economic goods are 
oft en produced in states where the rule of law may not be as eff ective as elsewhere, it is diffi  cult to both 
establish and remedy the human rights violations that are frequently seen to occur in such states. Th ere-
fore, the paper analyses whether it would be possible to remedy human rights violations from abroad, in 
other words from within those states where these products are sold to end-users. Th e paper focuses on 
selected instruments of international, European and national law in order to establish whether a remedy 
for such violations is present. It takes the bottom-up principle, i.e. it concentrates on such instruments 
which might be used by individuals, consumers in particular, rather than by states. Th e outcome of the 
contrib ution is that, in theory, it is possible to hold retailers partially liable for human rights violations as 
a means of applying remote leverage on the manufacturers.
Keywords: human rights violations, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, consumer 
protection, sweatshops, fair-trade, eco-label
1 Th e paper was prepared within project APVV-17-0641 “Improvement of eff ectiveness of legal 
regulation of public procurement and its application within EU law context”.
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1. Introduction
Our world has been driven by globalisation for several decades. During this 
period we have witnessed the process of “making the world smaller”, the process of 
unifi cation and the process of developing mutual dependences among states. One 
of the brighter sides of these processes is that the idea of human rights protection is 
becoming more and more widespread around the world. What was brought about by 
the Enlightenment in the 18th century as a novelty is now considered to be a standard 
throughout the continents. Or is it? 
From a formal point of view, the protection of human rights has become well 
established in a plethora of declarations, conventions and acts of national law. Th e 
protection has gone so far that not only states are responsible for violations of human 
rights. Th e Guiding Principles on business and human rights, a document of the 
United Nations,2 clearly requires business enterprises to comply with all applicable 
laws and, moreover, to respect human rights.
However, how does this legal framework work in practice? Is it really possible to 
make use of any of the declared rights and obligations? 
Th is paper aims to elaborate on these questions. From the methodological point 
of view, the paper sets the general framework of the legal environment for addressing 
human rights violation by business entities. It then overpasses solutions that can be 
engaged by state authorities and tries to fi nd some solutions from the bottom up, i.e. 
from the customers’ perspective in general.
Th e paper takes into account European Union (hereinaft er EU) law, the 
protection of consumers in particular, in order to see whether it is possible to hold 
business enterprises responsible for violations of human rights through the prism of 
protection of consumers as the end-buyers of products. As EU consumer protection 
law is, in general, subject to directives, it is necessary to review national law as well. 
In this regard Slovak law is chosen as an example of national law implementing EU 
directives. Furthermore, public procurement as a purchasing process having a public 
authority as a specifi c buyer, is also analysed.
For the purposes of this paper, the broadest meaning of human rights is taken 
into account, including working conditions and living environment.
2 Human Rights Council, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council 17/4 of 16 July 2011 – 
Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises (A/HRC/RES/17/4), 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/144/71/PDF/G1114471.pdf 
(31.12.2018); Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises; J.  Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 21 March 2011, https://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/121/90/PDF/G1112190.pdf (31.12.2018).
103
International Responsibility of Business for Violation of Human Rights...
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze 2019 vol. 24 nr 2
2. Responsibility of business entities for human right violations 
Th e responsibility of business entities for human rights violations is broadly 
discussed in the literature.3 
Currently there is no international treaty in force which confi rms explicitly the 
duty of business entities to protect human rights or their responsibility for human 
3 E.g. H. Van Der Wilt, Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes: Exploring the 
Possibilities, “Chinese Journal of International Law” 2013, pp. 43-77; L. Catá Backer, Multina-
tional Corporations, Transnational Law: Th e United Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International 
Law, “Columbia Human Rights Law Review” 2006, vol. 37(2), pp. 287–390; E. Pariotti, Interna-
tional Soft  Law, Human Rights and Non-State Actors: Towards the Accountability of Transnational 
Corporations?, “Human Rights Review” 2009, vol. 10(2), pp. 139-155, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s12142-008-0104-0; J. Nolan, Refi ning the Rules of the Game : Th e Corporate Responsibility to 
Respect Human Rights, “Utrecht Journal of International and European Law” 2014, vol. 30(78), 
pp. 7-23, https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/ujiel.ca; D. Lustig, Th ree Paradigms of Corpo-
rate Responsibility in International Law: Th e Kiobel Moment, “Journal of International Criminal 
Justice” 2014; J. Letnar Černič, Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: A Critical Analy-
sis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, “Hanse Law Review” 2008, vol. 4(1), 
pp. 71-100, http://hanselawreview.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Vol4No1Art05.pdf; J. Letnar 
Černič, Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: Analyzing the ILO Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, “Miskolc Journal of Interna-
tional Law” 2009, vol. 6(1), pp. 24-34, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1459548; D. Kinley and J. Tadaki, 
From Walk to Talk: Th e Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities of Corporations at Interna-
tional Law, “Virginia Journal of International Law” 2004, vol. 44, pp. 931-1023, https://ssrn.com/
abstract=923360; A. Grear and B.H. Weston, Th e Betrayal of Human Rights and the Urgency of 
Universal Corporate Accountability: Refl ections on a Post-Kiobel Lawscape, “Human Rights Law 
Review” 2015, vol. 15(1), pp. 21-44, https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngu044; K. Buhmann, Regulat-
ing Corporate Social and Human Rights Responsibilities at the Un Plane: Institutionalising New 
Forms of Law and Law-Making Approaches?, “Nordic Journal of International Law” 2009; E. De 
Brabandere, Non-State Actors, State-Centrism and Human Rights Obligations, “Leiden Journal of 
International Law” 2009, vol. 22(1), pp. 191-209; A. Clapham and S. Jerbi, Categories of Corpo-
rate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, “Hastings International and Comparative Law Review” 
2001, vol. 24, pp. 339- 349; E.C. Chaff ee, Th e Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, “Univer-
sity of Cincinnati Law Review” 2017, vol. 85, pp. 347-373, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957820; 
International Commission of Jurists, Corporate Complicity & Legal Accountability: Civil Reme-
dies 2008, vol. 3, p. 72; J.G. Ku, Th e Limits of Corporate Rights Under International Law, “Chicago 
Journal of International Law” 2012, vol. 12(2), pp. 729-754, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1627&context=cjil; A. McBeth, Crushed By An Anvil: A Case 
Study on Responsibility for Human Rights in the Extractive Sector, “Yale Human Rights and De-
velopment Law Journal” 2014, vol. 11(1), pp. 127–166; S. Michalowski, No Complicity Liability 
for Funding Gross Human Rights Violations ?, “Berkeley Journal of International Law” 2012, vol. 
30(2), pp. 451–524; J. Nolan, Corporate Accountability and Triple Bottom Line Reporting : Deter-
mining the Material Issues for Disclosure, “Enhancing Corporate Accountability: Prospects and 
Challenges” 2006, pp. 181–210; J. Nolan and L. Taylor, Corporate Responsibility for Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Rights in Search of a Remedy?, “Journal of Business Ethics” 2009, vol. 
87(2), pp. 433–451, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-009-0295-6.
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rights violations. Arguments in favour of a duty to obey human rights rely on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (hereinaft er Declaration). Th ese 
arguments can be split into two groups: arguments on the direct defi nition of 
responsibility and arguments on rights without fi nding responsible subjects. 
First, under the preamble of the Declaration “THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every 
individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind” 
and here the notion “every organ of society”, can be read also as private legal 
persons, including business entities. Second, the importance of the preamble is 
stressed since in two provisions the state is mentioned as the addressee of duties 
(Art. 16 and Art. 22 of the Declaration) which call for specifi c responsibility. 
Furthermore, reference to the preamble was used in draft ing the principles of 
responsibility of transnational corporations.4 Moreover, Art. 29 of the Declaration 
specifi es that “Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and 
full development of his personality is possible” and the duty covers state and non-
state subjects as well. Finally, Art. 30 stipulates that “Nothing in this Declaration 
may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in 
any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein” and thus accepts that subjects other than states have to 
follow the declaration.5 
Secondly, the approach to interpretation of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights considers it a list of the rights of human beings without defi ning 
persons responsible for the protection and non-violation of these rights. Hence 
the declaration endorses rights erga omnes. McBeth also sees confi rmation of these 
erga omnes eff ects in the preamble (rights must be respected by every individual, 
every organ of society).6
Since corporations always act through their owners, directors or employees, 
there are diff erent concepts of how to attribute responsibility for acts of natural 
persons in relation to legal persons: (1) vicarious liability; (2) alter ego liability; 
(3) respondeat superior; (4) failure of management/control/surveillance.
From the point of view of human rights violations several forms of business 
involvement can occur: direct violation, indirect violation by direct complicity, 
indirect complicity, tacit complicity or providing financial assistance. Direct 
4 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).
5 D. Kinley, J. Tadaki, From Walk to Talk…, op. cit., pp. 948-949.
6 A. McBeth, Every Organ of Society: Th e Responsibility of Non-State Actors for the Realization of 
Human Rights, “Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy” 2008, vol. 30(1), p. 42.
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violation occurs when the business entity is the main perpetrator of the violation, 
e.g. looting or exploitation of assets or resources in a war zone or other place 
of conflict, use of slave labour from or in detention camps. Indirect violation 
occurs when a direct perpetrator violates human rights and a business entity 
provides certain support or other benefits, regardless of whether or not the direct 
perpetrator is deemed liable. Direct complicity covers situations where a business 
entity provides the means or tools to commit violations (e.g. providing materials 
to make prohibited chemical weapons, selling software designed to facilitate 
civil repression). Indirect complicity addresses situations where a business 
benefits from human rights violations (e.g. via the repression or relocation of 
local inhabitants to acquire access to raw resources or infrastructure). Tacit 
complicity is closely linked to corporate governance and makes enterprises liable 
for “remaining silent” on human rights violations, particularly in host countries. 
Finally, businesses can be considered complicit by the existence of business links, 
by providing finance or other assistance to keep a regime in place that is violating 
human rights, or by buying goods originating from processes related to human 
rights violations.
Th e majority of large scale violations reported that are attributable to business 
entities and which typically involve the abuse of workers’ rights and human rights 
in general via environmental damage, relate to the extraction of mineral resources 
(i.e. the oil, gas and mining industries).7 
However, from the consumer’s point of view, agriculture and the food industry 
are the most sensitive areas and grave violations of human rights attributable to 
food producers8 has led to consumer boycotts.9 
Similarly, the mass production of other consumer products, particularly 
textiles, and the so-called “sweatshops” in which they are produced, have also 
7 See e.g. cases John Doe I, et al., v. UNOCAL Corp., et al., 395 F.3d 932 (9 Cir. 2002), Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013), Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 
2010), JOHN DOE I, et al v. EXXON MOBIL CORP, et al, 1:01-cv-01357, No. 455 (D.D.C. Sep. 
24, 2014), Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp, 654 F.3d 11 No. 1:07-cv-01022, No. 1:01-cv-01357, 
(D.C. Cir. Jul. 8, 2011).
8 See e.g. John Doe I v. Nestle, USA, 10-56739 (9th Cir. 2014).
9 See e.g. K. Sikkink, Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: Th e Case of the WHO/
UNICEF Code, “Review Literature and Arts of the Americas” 1986, vol. 40(4), pp. 815–840; 
W.H. Meyer, Activism and Research on TNCs and Human Rights: Building a New International 
Normative Regime, (in:) J.G. Frynas and S. Pegg (eds.), Transnational Corporations and Human 
Rights, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, New York 2003), pp. 33–52; A.  Wawryk, Regulating 
Transnational Corporations through Corporate Codes of Conduct, (in:) J.G. Frynas and S. Pegg 
(eds.), Transnational Corporations…, op. cit., pp. 53–78.
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been targeted by human rights activists, consumers and politicians;10 more so aft er 
the Rana Plaza disaster.11 
3. UN Guiding Principles and current attempts to introduce 
international accountability of businesses for violation of human rights
Th e basic avenue for enforcement of human rights in a particular country is via 
the claims of addressees of these rights to local enforcement bodies (administrative 
offi  ces and courts). However, this approach cannot be seen to be eff ective in cases 
where local governments are not in the least bit focused on human rights protection 
or are themselves heavily and systematically engaged in such violations. Th e paper 
limits itself to such regulatory mechanisms which are reachable by individuals rather 
than by states. Apart from national and European rules, the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights 201112 (hereinaft er Guiding Principles) are analysed. Th e 
analysis seeks to answer two questions: fi rst, is there a substantive legal background 
for a possible challenge? Second, who has legal standing for such challenge?
Th e Guiding Principles are divided into three pillars. Th e fi rst pillar deals with 
the state’s duty to protect human rights, the second pillar focuses on corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights and the third pillar sets out the principles 
related to access to remedy. 
Regarding the fi rst pillar, it is important to see whether there is a principle which 
would oblige a state to protect against human rights violations which occur outside 
10 For further details see e.g. T.A. Hemphill and G.O. White, Th e World Economic Forum and Nike: 
Emerging “Shared Responsibility” and Institutional Control Models for Achieving a Socially 
Responsible Global Supply Chain?, “Business and Human Rights Journal” 2016, vol. 1(2), 
pp.  307- 313, https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2016.3; J.  Nolan, With Power Comes Responsibility: 
Human Rights and Corporate Accountability, “University of New South Wales Law Journal” 2005, 
vol. 28(3), pp. 581-613; J. Nolan and L. Taylor, Corporate Responsibility…, op. cit.; B. Dubach and 
M.T. MacHado, Th e Importance of Stakeholder Engagement in the Corporate Responsibility to 
Respect Human Rights, “International Review of the Red Cross” 2012, vol. 94(887), pp. 1047- 1068, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383113000404; D.  Davitti, Refi ning the Protect, Respect and 
Remedy Framework for Business and Human Rights and Its Guiding Principles, “Human Rights 
Law Review” 2016, vol. 16(1), pp. 55-75, https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngv037; A. Kolk and R. van 
Tulder, Setting New Global Rules? TNCs and Codes of Conduct, “Transnational Corporations” 
2005, vol. 14(3), pp. 1-27, https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650309343407; A. Kolk and R. van Tulder, 
International Codes Of Conduct Trends, Sectors, Issues and Eff ectiveness, 2002, www.fb k.eur.nl/
DPT/VG8.
11 M. Aizawa and S. Tripathi, Beyond Rana Plaza: Next Steps for the Global Garment Industry and 
Bangladeshi Manufacturers, “Business and Human Rights Journal” 2016, vol. 1(1), pp. 145-151, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2015.12; J. Nolan, With Power…, op. cit.
12 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, J. Ruggie, 
Guiding Principles…, op. cit.
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its territory13 but where the product derived from such violations ends up within it. 
In the case of a state authority doing business with an enterprise, the state should 
promote respect for human rights in terms of contracts.14 However, it would be a rare 
event for a state to be entering into a contract to buy, say clothes, directly from an 
enterprise manufacturing them in an Asian country.
Th e Guiding Principles provide for extra-territorial involvement in cases of 
abuse of human rights in confl ict-aff ected areas.15 States should help ensure that 
business enterprises operating in those contexts are not involved with such abuses. 
However, as it fl ows from the commentary to this principle, it applies to transnational 
corporations, which is a limiting factor, together with the requirement of the place of 
production being in a confl ict zone.
Regarding corporate responsibility pursuant to the Guiding Principles, 
requirements are mainly towards an enterprise’s own behaviour.16 However, 
Foundation Principle 1317 states that enterprises should try to prevent or at least 
mitigate human rights violations which are directly linked to its operations. It can 
be derived from this principle that even if an enterprise itself does not breach human 
13 UN Guiding Principles, I. Th e State Duty to Protect Human Rights, Foundation Principle 1. States 
must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, 
including business enterprises. Th is requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish 
and redress such abuse through eff ective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication. However, 
this principle is not directly addressed to third states.
14 UN Guiding Principles, I.  Th e State Duty to Protect Human Rights, Operational Principle 6. 
States should promote respect for human rights by business enterprises with which they conduct 
commercial transactions.
15 UN Guiding Principles, I.  Th e State Duty to Protect Human Rights, Operational Principle 7. 
Because the risk of gross human rights abuses is heightened in confl ict aff ected areas, States should 
help ensure that business enterprises operating in those contexts are not involved with such abuses, 
including by: (a) Engaging at the earliest stage possible with business enterprises to help them identify, 
prevent and mitigate the human rights-related risks of their activities and business relationships; 
(b) Providing adequate assistance to business enterprises to assess and address the heightened risks 
of abuses, paying special attention to both gender-based and sexual violence; (c) Denying access 
to public support and services for a business enterprise that is involved with gross human rights 
abuses and refuses to cooperate in addressing the situation; (d) Ensuring that their current policies, 
legislation, regulations and enforcement measures are eff ective in addressing the risk of business 
involvement in gross human rights abuses.
16 UN Guiding Principles, I.  Th e corporate responsibility to respect human rights, Foundation 
Principle 11. Business enterprises should respect human rights. Th is means that they should avoid 
infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with 
which they are involved.
17 UN Guiding Principles, I.  Th e corporate responsibility to respect human rights, Foundation 
Principle 13. Th e responsibility to respect human rights requires that business enterprises: (a) Avoid 
causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, and address 
such impacts when they occur; (b) Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are 
directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they 
have not contributed to those impacts.
108
Ondrej Blažo, Mária T. Patakyová
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze 2019 vol. 24 nr 2
rights, but they are breached by its business partners, the enterprise should not turn 
a blind eye to this. Th e action required from an enterprise depends on its leverage 
over the entity violating human rights, how crucial the business relationship with that 
entity is to the enterprise, the severity of the violation and whether terminating the 
relationship with the entity would generate negative human rights consequences.18 
Th e enterprise should also verify the eff ectiveness of the action.19
Guiding Principles 16 et seq. provides for particular commitments which should 
be met by enterprises. 
Regarding the third pillar, access to remedy, states are obliged to provide judicial 
and other means in order to secure a remedy.20 However, this duty to act applies only 
to the state’s territory or jurisdiction.
Moreover, in relation to the real impact of the Guiding Principles, it is important 
to say that they apply to all states and to all business enterprises, both transnational and 
others, regardless of their size, sector, location, ownership and structure.21 However, 
the Guiding Principles are not binding. Th ey are implemented into national legal 
orders via national action plans. However, many states have thus far not adopted such 
plans, Slovakia included.22 Th e EU has partially implemented the Guiding Principles, 
for example by the amendment of Directive 2013/34/EU23 which incorporates an 
obligation to issue a non-fi nancial statement for undertakings which are public-
interest entities having 500 or more employees.24 Nevertheless, this obligation is still 
very limited and does not provide a solution to the problem as a whole.
18 UN Guiding Principles, I.  Th e corporate responsibility to respect human rights, Operational 
Principle 19, Commentary.
19 UN Guiding Principles, I.  Th e corporate responsibility to respect human rights, Operational 
Principle 20. In order to verify whether adverse human rights impacts are being addressed, business 
enterprises should track the eff ectiveness of their response. Tracking should: (a) Be based on 
appropriate qualitative and quantitative indicators; (b) Draw on feedback from both internal and 
external sources, including aff ected stakeholders.
20 UN Guiding Principles, I. Access to Remedy, Foundation Principle 25. As part of their duty to 
protect against business-related human rights abuse, States must take appropriate steps to ensure, 
through judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate means, that when such abuses occur 
within their territory and/or jurisdiction those aff ected have access to eff ective remedy.
21 UN Guiding Principles, p. 1.
22 UN Human Rights, Offi  ce of the High Commissioner: State national action plans on 
Business and Human Rights. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/
NationalActionPlans.aspx (27.12.2018).
23 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26  June 2013 on the 
annual fi nancial statements, consolidated fi nancial statements and related reports of certain types 
of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (hereinaft er referred as “Directive 
2013/34/EU”).
24 A. Yilmaz and R. Chambers, New EU Human Rights Reporting Requirements for Companies: 
One Step beyond the Current UK Rules, EU Law Analysis, 2014, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.
com/2014/10/new-eu-human-rights-reporting.html.
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Th erefore, when it comes to the legal standing of individuals, the Guiding 
Principles do not provide a legal basis for judicial proceedings. Th e Guiding 
Principles are merely a soft  law instrument25 and its true impact, especially when it 
comes to corporate responsibility to respect human rights, remains questionable.26
Being aware of the legal weakness of the Guiding Principles, in 2014 the UN 
Human Rights Council endorsed a resolution establishing a working group to 
prepare a draft  legally binding international treaty dealing with the responsibility of 
businesses in relation to human rights violation.27 Th is approach divided the Human 
Rights Council28 itself as well as academia,29 nevertheless, in July 2018 the “Zero 
Draft ”30 was submitted to the Human Rights Council for consideration.
Attempts to introduce an international instrument confi rming the legal 
responsibility of businesses for human rights violations is not the only tool developed 
by the UN to regulate business activities. From the initiative of the then UN Secretary-
General Kofi  Annan, the UN Global Compact (hereinaft er GC) was launched in 
2000. Although the GC lists ten principles31 the legal concept is completely diff erent. 
25 J.G.  Ruggie, Regulating Multinationals: Th e UN Guiding Principles, Civil Society, and 
International Legalization, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2474236 (27.12.2018), p. 6.
26 C.M. O’Brien, S. Dhanarajan, Th e Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: A Status 
Review, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2607888 (27.12.2018), pp. 19, 20.
27 Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises with respect to human rights, A/HRC/RES/26/9
28 Th e resolution was adopted by 20 votes in favour (Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, China, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Venezuela, Vietnam) 14 members voted against (Austria, 
Czechia, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Montenegro, Korea, Romania, FYROM, UK 
and USA) and 13 members abstained (Argentina, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Gabon, Kuwait, 
Maldives, Mexico, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, UAE).
29 See e.g. M.K. Addo, Th e Reality…, op. cit.; J. Ruggie, Th e Past as Prologue? A Moment of Truth 
for UN Business and Human Rights Treaty, Institute for Human Rights and Business, 2014, 
https://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-rights/the-past-as-prologue-a-moment-
of-truth-for-un-business-and-human-rights-tre/?; O.  De Schutter, Towards a New Treaty on 
Business and Human Rights, “Business and Human Rights Journal” 2016, vol. 1(1), pp. 41–67, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2015.5; J. Nolan, Th e Corporate Responsibility…, op. cit.; D. Bilchitz, 
Th e Necessity for a Business and Human Rights Treaty, “Business and Human Rights Journal” 
2016, vol. 1(2), pp. 203–227, https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2016.13.
30 Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/Draft LBI.pdf (30.09.2018). 
31 (Principle 1) Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed 
human rights; and (Principle 2) make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
(Principle 3) Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the eff ective recognition 
of the right to collective bargaining; (Principle 4) the elimination of all forms of forced and 
compulsory labour; (Principle 5) the eff ective abolition of child labour; and (Principle 6) the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. (Principle 7) Businesses 
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Th ese principles are not authoritatively imposed as rules on business entities, rather 
they are adopted and adhered to voluntarily. Enterprises that join the initiative are 
required to incorporate the GC in their business strategy and submit annual reports 
on its implementation and eff ect.32 Th e so-called “integrity measures” attached to the 
GC can be considered the initiative’s enforcement mechanism which guards against 
abuse of UN principles in general and the principles of the GC in particular, such 
as failure in submitting reports and grave or systematic violation of the principles 
themselves. Where a violation occurs two forms of sanction can be imposed: (1) 
labelling the business as “non-communicating” or “non-active”; (2) de-listing the 
business from the GC initiative.33 It should be noted that this enforcement mechanism 
is quite active: currently ca. 9,700 businesses participate in the initiative and ca.7,500 
entities have thus far been de-listed.34
4. Voluntary codes and customers’ perspective
Adhering to the GC is a form of self-regulation whereby a business entity 
voluntarily follows certain standards and it is irrelevant as to whether or not such 
standards are laid down by a public authority. Even accepting the principle of a “code 
of conduct” can produce a diff erent market eff ect. Th e declaration of accepting or 
respecting a certain code of conduct can be an act of pure altruism but it is also sends 
an important message to investors,35 shareholders, business partners, public sector, 
employees and customers, and thus it produces legal eff ects.36 Following certain 
codes of conduct or standards of social and environmental protection can be required 
or expected by consumers and can be an important criterion in purchase decisions. 
On the basis of a Eurobarometer survey, 32% of Europeans (from 70% in Sweden to 
12% in Portugal) answered that “ecolabels” play an important role in their decision 
making, however, on the other hand 39% of Europeans (from 6% in Sweden to 64% 
should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; (Principle 8) undertake 
initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and (Principle 9) encourage the 
development and diff usion of environmentally friendly technologies. (Principle 10) Businesses 
should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.
32 United Nations, Business Application, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/HowToParticipate/
How_to_Apply_Business.html (31.12.2018).
33 United Nations Global Compact, Note on Integrity Measures, 2010, https://www.unglobalcompact.
org/docs/about_the_gc/Integrity_measures/Integrity_Measures_Note_EN.pdf.
34 United Nations Global Compact, Note on Integrity Measures, 2010, https://www.unglobalcompact.
org/docs/about_the_gc/Integrity_measures/Integrity_Measures_Note_EN.pdf.
35 J.J.  Janney, G.  Dess and V.  Forlani, Glass Houses? Market Reactions to Firms Joining the UN 
Global Compact, “Journal of Business Ethics” 2009, vol. 90(3), p. 407, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10551-009-0052-x.
36 D. Kinley and J. Tadaki, From Walk to Talk…, op. cit.
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in Portugal) never take notice of labels.37 Another question related to the reliability 
of such labels. According the same survey, only 24% of Europeans (from 54% in 
Cyprus to 9% in France) totally agree that “eco-labelled” products are really eco-
friendly, while 54% tended to agree to such eff ect.38 As for the survey on the relevance 
of labels on textile products, labels related to social aspects of their manufacture 
are less important than environmental issues.39 17% of Europeans were prepared 
pay over 10% more for product produced under adequate working conditions, 24% 
were prepared to pay up to 10% more and 43% said they would chose “worker-
friendly” products but only if the price was the same.40 However these results did 
not correspond with the respondents views on “social” labels – only 12% always take 
them into account, 33% sometimes take them into account and 40% either never take 
them into account or admitted that working conditions were of no concern to them.41 
Th e most common reason for this is that consumers rarely encounter labels of this 
kind even though they would have a preference for social-friendly products (ca. 80%) 
and up to 40% stated that they did not trust such labels.42
As the aforementioned surveys illustrate, ecolabels and social labels play 
a certain role in the decision making process of consumers even though they are 
not always trusted. Th erefore the analysis which follows focuses on consumer law 
and, in particular, how labelling or declarations of business to consumers regarding 
environmental and social policies are considered in relation to protecting consumers 
against misleading advertisements and information. Furthermore, public bodies 
as a specifi c type of consumer will be looked into because, theoretically, it is they 
who by requiring products to be provided bearing such labels can push businesses to 
improve ecological and social standards within their respective manufacturing and 
supply chains.
5. EU consumer protection 
EU Consumer Protection Law is established in directives and spread in many 
pieces of legislation, however, for the purposes of this paper it can be summarised as 
following.
37 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 468 Report Attitudes of European Citizens towards 
the Environment, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffi  ce/publicopinion, p. 30.
38 Ibid, p. 31.
39 Matrix Insight, Study of the Need and Options for the Harmonisation of the Labelling of Textile 
and Clothing Products, 2013, p. 7.
40 Ibid, p. 81.
41 Ibid, p. 82.
42 Ibid.
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First, pursuant to Directive 2011/83/EU,43 consumers are entitled to several 
rights, particularly the right to information and the right to withdrawal in relation 
to certain types of contracts. However, the main goal of this Directive is to facilitate 
trade within the internal market.44 Th e right of consumers to have the products they 
buy manufactured in a way compatible with human rights protection is not among 
the rights explicitly enumerated in the Directive. 
Yet, there are provisions which might be interpreted in such a way as to 
incorporate information on the compliance of the production procedure with human 
rights. Article 5 of Directive 2011/83/EU, provides for information requirements 
for contracts other than distance or off -premises contracts, i.e. for contracts where 
a consumer buys goods from a brick and mortar store. Article 6 of Directive 2011/83/
EU covers information requirements for distance and off -premises contracts. Under 
both articles, the trader is obliged to provide information on the main characteristics 
of the goods, to an appropriate extent and in a clear and comprehensible manner.45 
It might be claimed that the production process of say an item of clothing, produced 
in a manufacturing environment that is respectful of human rights, qualifi es as 
a main characteristics of the goods. Nevertheless, there is no recital to suggest such 
interpretation.
As to legal standing, Directive 2011/83/EU expressly states that an action under 
national law before a court or before a competent administrative body may be taken 
by consumer organisations having a legitimate interest in protecting consumers.46 
Th e action shall ensure that the national provisions transposing Directive 2011/83/
EU are applied.
Second, Directive 2005/29/EC47 provides for the specifi cation of such contractual 
provisions which are to be considered as unfair. Th e aim of Directive 2005/29/EC 
is again protection of the internal market as well as the protection of consumers.48 
43 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on 
consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and 
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinaft er referred to as: 
“Directive 2011/83/EU”) (OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, pp. 64–88).
44 See, for instance, Directive 2011/83/EU, recital 6.
45 Article 5 para 1 p. a) and Article 6 para 1 p. a) of Directive 2011/83/EU.
46 Article 23 para 2 p. b) and Article 6 para 1 p. a) of Directive 2011/83/EU.
47 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning 
unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending 
Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) (hereinaft er referred as “Directive 
2005/29/EC”) (OJ L 149, 11.06.2005, pp. 22–39).
48 Directive 2005/29/EC, recital 23, Article 1.
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Similarly to Directive 2011/83/EU, there is no explicit right to have products 
manufactured in a way compatible with human rights protection. 
Unfair commercial practices are defi ned in Article 5 of Directive 2005/29/
EC. In essence, in order for commercial practices to be considered unfair, they must 
meet two requirements: fi rst, they are contrary to the requirements of professional 
diligence; second, they distort the economic behaviour of average consumers. Th e 
two main groups of unfair commercial practices are misleading practices49 and 
aggressive practices50. We will focus on the former.
Misleading practices can be addressed by Directive 2005/29/EC in cases where 
traders:
 – mislead consumers by falsely claiming that products are manufactured in 
a human-friendly manner when they are not;51
 – mislead consumers by falsely claiming that they are committed to the 
observance of human rights in their business relations when they are not;52
 – mislead consumers by adopting codes of conduct that require them to 
observe human rights in their business relations but do not comply with such 
codes;53
 – do not provide “material information54 that the average consumer needs, 
according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby 
causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision 
that he would not have taken otherwise”.55 Although this does not directly 
fl ow from recitals, the provision might be interpreted as to included omission 
to state whether products they sell were manufactured in compliance with 
human right standards;
49 A commercial practice is misleading, in essence, if it contains false information and is therefore 
untruthful or in any way, including overall presentation, deceives, and it causes or is likely to cause 
consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise. See Article 6 
para 1 of Directive 2005/29/EC.
50 A commercial practice is aggressive, in essence, if by harassment, coercion, including the use of 
physical force, or undue infl uence, it signifi cantly impairs the consumer’s freedom of choice or 
and thereby causes him or to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise. 
See Article 8 of Directive 2005/29/EC.
51 Such statement might be subsumed under Article 6 para 1 p. a) of Directive 2005/29/EC – the 
nature of the product.
52 Such statement might be subsumed under Article 6 para 1 p. c) of Directive 2005/29/EC – the 
extent of the trader’s commitments.
53 Such statement might be subsumed under Article 6 para 2 p. b) of Directive 2005/29/EC – non-
compliance with codes of conduct. See also Annex I p. 1 of Directive 2005/29/EC. Annex I which 
enumerates commercial practices which are in all circumstances considered unfair.
54 Th e enumeration of material information in relation to invitation to purchase is provided by 
Article 7 para 4 of Directive 2005/29/EC.
55 Article 7 para 1of Directive 2005/29/EC.
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 – fail to provide clear or timely information described in the previous point.56 
Regarding legal standing, Article 11 of Directive 2005/29/EC secures the right 
to take legal action against unfair commercial practices for persons or organisations 
having a legitimate interest in combating unfair commercial practices, including 
competitors. Consumers shall be included in this group.
6. Slovak consumer protection 
As stated above, directives are subject to national implementation. In the Slovak 
legal order, there are several pieces of legislation which protect consumers. Act No. 
250/2007 Coll. (hereinaft er Act on consumer protection)57 enumerates various rights 
of consumers, among which there is the right to buy products that meet a specifi c 
standard of quality.58 If the quality is not prescribed, traders may sell products 
of a lesser standard of quality but only if consumers are made clearly aware of the 
diff erences before purchase.59 We assume this right might be interpreted in such a way 
as to enable consumers to buy products which are manufactured without infringing 
human rights. However, there is nothing in the Act on consumer protection which 
would directly require such interpretation. 
Apart from enumerated rights, traders are obliged to maintain certain ethical 
standards. For example, Article 4 (8) of the Act on consumer protection provides that 
“Th e seller must not act contrary to good moral behaviour, (…) conduct contrary to 
such behaviour means, in particular, conduct which is contrary to established traditions 
and which show obvious signs of discrimination or deviation from the rules of moral 
integrity recognised in the sale of the product and the provision of the service, or which 
might [as a result of misleading information on the part of the seller] cause harm to 
the consumer (…)”.60 Th us, if the sale of goods manufactured in a way that breaches 
human rights is considered to be contrary to good moral behaviour, pursuant to 
Article 4 of the Act on consumer protection, such sale would be prohibited. However, 
nothing in this Act directly indicates that the provision should be triggered in the 
situation described.
56 Such statement might be subsumed under Article 7 para 2 of Directive 2005/29/EC.
57 Act No. 250/2007 Coll. on protection of consumers, as amended, hereinaft er referred as “Act on 
consumer protection” (Zákon č. 250/2007 Z.z. o ochrane spotrebiteľa a o zmene zákona Slovenskej 
národnej rady č. 372/1990 Zb. o priestupkoch v znení neskorších predpisov), https://www.slov-
lex.sk/static/pdf/2007/250/ZZ_2007_250_20190101.pdf (1.01.2019).
58 Section 3 para 1 of the Act on consumer protection.
59 Section 4 para 1 p. a) of the Act on consumer protection.
60 Section 4 para 8 of the Act on consumer protection.
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Unfair commercial practices are regulated in a similar manner as indicated above 
in relation to Directive 2005/29/EC.61 Th erefore, we referred to the elaboration on 
misleading practices presented above. Th e same applies to the obligation to provide 
information presented in relation to Directive 2011/38/EU.62
As far as legal standing is concerned, any consumer may challenge a violation of 
his or her rights before a court.63 Th e same rights are given to legal persons protecting 
the rights of consumers.64 
Apart from the Act on consumer protection, consumers are signifi cantly 
protected by the Civil Code.65 Section 53 of the Civil Code holds unfair contractual 
terms null and void, unless they are a derivative of negotiation. If a consumer contract 
contains a provision which is an unfair contractual term and in conclusion of the 
contract an unfair commercial practice was used, such contract is ipso lege null and 
void.66 Section 53 also provides a non-exhaustive list of unfair terms, however, none 
of these terms is directly applicable to the issue at hand.67 
None the less, if there is a contractual term that infers, e.g. that the trader is 
not obliged to explore the process of garment production and its compatibility with 
human rights, and such contractual term is declared unfair by a court, the trader 
is obliged not to use such term or a term with similar meaning in dealings with 
consumers.68
As to legal standing, consumers are entitled to lodge an action to a competent 
court in order to establish that a particular contractual term is unfair. Th ere are no 
specifi c procedural provisions within the relevant section of the Civil Code. Th e 
litigation process would be governed by the Civil Procedural Code.69
61 For the exact implementation of the relevant provisions from Directive 2005/29/EC, see section 7 
et seq. of the Act on consumer protection.
62 For the exact implementation of the relevant provisions from Directive 2011/38/EU, see 
section10a et seq. of the Act on consumer protection.
63 Section 3 para 5 of the Act on consumer protection.
64 Ibid.
65 Act No. 40/1964 Coll. Civil Code, as amended (Zákon č. 40/1964 Zb. Občiansky zákonník v 
znení nesjkorších predpisov), hereinaft er referred as “Civil Code”, https://www.slov-lex.sk/static/
pdf/1964/40/ZZ_1964_40_20190130.pdf (30.01.2019). Please kindly note that there are also other 
Acts of Law which protect consumers, however, they are deliberately omitted from this paper, 
such as protection of consumers in off -premise sales, or protection of consumers in fi nancial 
relations.
66 Section 53d of the Civil Code.
67 However, an interpretation for the benefi t of consumer is always used when a  provision is 
ambiguous.
68 Section 53a para 1 of the Civil Code.
69 Act No. 160/2015 Coll. Civil Procedural Code, as amended (Zákon č. 160/2015 Z.z. Civilný 
sporový poriadok v znení neskorších predpisov), https://www.slov-lex.sk/static/pdf/2015/160/
ZZ_2015_160_20181212.pdf (12.12.2018).
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7. Selected examples of consumer protection case law
Th e case Kasky v. Nike was brought by an anti-sweatshop activist against 
the communication of a transnational corporation on working conditions in its 
factories.70 Th is case was, however settled out of court, and both parties considered 
denial of certiorari by the US Supreme Court as their victory. Although the case 
started as a consumer protection case based on alleged false information provided by 
Nike regarding working conditions in its factories and level of wages paid, the crucial 
legal question taken into consideration by the Supreme Court of California revolved 
around the extent of institutional freedom of speech. 
Although there is no current case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (hereinaft er CJEU) dealing directly with the misuse of labels on the 
environmental and social aspects of advertising, certain standards of assessment can 
be identifi ed.
In the Bankia case the CJEU71 stressed that the diff erence between unfair 
commercial practices and unfair contractual terms, is that unfair contractual terms 
are per se “not binding on the consumer”, while unfair commercial practices are 
“merely” prohibited.72 Finding that a commercial practice is unfair has no direct 
eff ect on whether the contract is valid.73 Th erefore, even though the court fi nds 
that a certain practice was “misleading”, i.e. it causes or is likely to cause the average 
consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise, 
it is only one of the elements involved in evaluating unfairness of a contractual term 
and nullity of it.74 
Th erefore wrongly stated or abused eco-labels and social labels do not 
automatically cause nullity of the contract. It must also be reminded that eco-labels 
as well as social labels do not generally declare the quality of the product, merely the 
conditions involved in its manufacture. Hence, in this sense, a consumer can hardly 
claim injury, loss or other damage caused by a falsely labelled or advertised product. 
Also in the Bankia case the CJEU limited the relevance of codes of conduct: 
“the directive does not require the Member States to provide for there to be direct 
consequences for traders solely on the ground that they have not complied with a code 
of conduct aft er subscribing thereto” and therefore the Member States are not obliged 
to introduce legislation which “confer a legally binding nature on a code of conduct”.75
70 J. Fisher, Free Speech to Have Sweatshops? How Kasky v. Nike Might Provide a Useful Tool to 
Improve Sweatshop Conditions, “Boston College Th ird World Law Journal” 2006, vol. 26(2), pp. 
267–310, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj/.
71 Judgment of 19 September 2018, Bankia, C-109/17, EU:C:2018:735.
72 Ibid, para. 37,41.
73 Ibid, para. 50.
74 Judgment of 15 March 2012, Pereničová and Perenič, C453/10, EU:C:2012:144, para. 46, 47. 
75 Supra note 70, para. 58, 59.
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8. Public procurement and environmental and social standards
Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement (hereinaft er Public Sector 
Directive),76 included some provisions that enabled measures concerning 
environmental, social and labour issues to be addressed. First, according to its 
Article 18(2) “Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that in the 
performance of public contracts economic operators comply with applicable obligations 
in the fi elds of environmental, social and labour law established by Union law, national 
law, collective agreements or by the international environmental, social and labour law 
provisions listed in Annex X”. Second, under Article 56(1) “Contracting authorities 
may decide not to award a contract to the tenderer submitting the most economically 
advantageous tender where they have established that the tender does not comply with 
the applicable obligations referred to in Article 18(2)”. Th ird, under Article 57(4)(a) 
“Contracting authorities may exclude or may be required by Member States to exclude 
from participation in a procurement procedure any economic operator (...) where 
the contracting authority can demonstrate by any appropriate means a violation of 
applicable obligations referred to in Article 18(2)”. Fourth, the Contracting authority 
shall require explanation of abnormally low tenders, particularly in relation to, inter 
alia, compliance with obligation referred to in Article 18(2). Th e diff erence between 
these provisions of the Public Sector Directive is apparent: Article 18(2) constitutes 
a mandatory duty of the Member State; however it does not provide a certain 
form of transposition of this duty, and Articles 56(1), 57(4)(a) and 69(2)(d) enable 
contracting authorities to enforce requirements laid down by Article 18(2), however 
this provision of the directive is optional or merely “enabling”. 
As case law has shown these provisions do not establish an unlimited eco-
friendly and social-friendly framework for public procurement, it only allows some 
of these features to be considered. Th ese limits were explained in case Commission 
v. Netherlands77 in which the CJEU declared incompatible with the directive explicit 
requirements established by the contracting authority that included: a technical 
specifi cation “requiring that certain products to be supplied were to bear a specifi c 
ecolabel, rather than using detailed specifi cations” and a minimum level of technical 
ability “that tenderers comply with the ‘criteria of sustainable purchasing and socially 
responsible business’ and state how they comply with those criteria and ‘contribute 
to improving the sustainability of the coff ee market and to environmentally, socially 
and economically responsible coff ee production’”. Further, the court found that the 
requirements for tenderers to “comply with ‘the criteria of sustainable purchasing 
and socially responsible business’ and to state how they comply with those 
76 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94, 28.03.2014, pp. 65–242).
77 Judgment of 10 May 2012, Commission v. Netherlands, C-368/10, EU:C:2012:284.
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criteria and ‘contribute to improving the sustainability of the coff ee market and to 
environmentally, socially and economically responsible coff ee production’”78 were 
insuffi  ciently clear and precise and did not comply with the obligation of transparency 
provided for in Article 2 of the Directive. Hence the list of international instruments 
included in Annex X constitutes an exhaustive list of the social standards that can be 
considered in public procurement. 
Th e CJEU also faced the question of whether a contracting authority may 
require certain labour standards for the workers of a tenderer. Although the court 
confi rmed that it is permissible to require that an equal wage be paid to all workers 
employed on a specifi c contract, in Rüff ert79 and in Bundesdruckerei,80 it did not allow 
to require a minimum wage to be set by collective agreement. However, in RegioPost 
it allowed to require the statutory minimum wage to be paid by contractors as well as 
subcontractors.81
Th e fi nal part of this chapter will review how the provisions of Directive 2014/24/
EU were transposed into the Slovak legal order, i.e. into Act No 343/2015 Coll. on 
Public Procurement and Amendment of Certain Laws as amended (hereinaft er 
Public Procurement Act).82 First, a valuable tool is enshrined in this Act in relation 
to the prequalifi cation requirements for economic operators wishing to participate 
in public tenders. Under its Article 32(1)g), a prospective tenderer shall fulfi l the 
prequalifi cation criterion if, inter alia, within the three year period preceding the call 
for bids or launch of the procurement procedure the operator “has not committed 
a serious breach of obligations in the fi eld of environmental protection, social law or 
labour law (…) for which a sanction has been lawfully imposed which the contracting 
authority can prove”. Slovak legislation thus joins the enforcement of Article 18(2) of 
the Public Sector Directive and exclusion criteria and does not refer to an exhaustive 
list of environmental, social and labour regulations. Th e Act itself does not explain 
the notion “serious violation” and the Offi  ce for Public Procurement was asked to 
provide such explanation by way of “methodological guidance”. However, in its 
Methodological Guidance No. 16013-5000/2017 of 6 November 2017,83 the Offi  ce did 
not provide an explanation which would have defi ned which labour, environmental 
and social rules are relevant for exclusion from public procurement. In Decision 
No. 1838-9000/2014-KR/10 of 3 April 2014 the Council of the Offi  ce for Public 
Procurement (appellate body) confi rmed that only a grave violation can establish 
78 Judgment of 10 May 2012, Commission v. Netherlands, C-368/10, EU:C:2012:284, operative part.
79 Judgment of 3 April 2008, Rüff ert, C-346/06, EU:C:2008:189. 
80 Judgment of 18 September 2014, Bundesdruckerei, C-549/13, EU:C:2014:2235.
81 Judgment of 17 November 2015, RegioPost, C-115/14, EU:C:2015:760. 
82 Zákon č. 3434/2015 Z.z. o verejnom obstarávaní a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov, 
https://www.slov-lex.sk/static/pdf/2015/343/ZZ_2015_343_20190101.pdf (1.01.2019).
83 Available at: https://www.uvo.gov.sk/metodicke-usmernenia-zakon-c-3432015-z-z/docu-
ment/428662 (31.12.2018).
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reason for exclusion of an operator from public procurement and the gravity of the 
violation can be derived from the circumstances of the case and its outcome, e.g. the 
level of fi ne imposed.84
Another tool for reviewing human rights standards is the examination of 
abnormally low bids. Under Article 53(2)d) of the Public Procurement Act, the 
commission for evaluation of bids shall ask for an explanation of an abnormally 
low bid, inter alia, from the point of view of the fulfi lment of statutory obligations 
laid down by labour law, in particular with regard to minimum wage entitlements, 
environmental protection and social rights under special regulations. 
Reserved contracts to sheltered workshops and economic operators whose main 
aim is the social and professional integration of disabled or disadvantaged persons, 
is a tool for protecting the rights of a specifi c group of workers and is provided for in 
Article 20 of the Public Sector Directive as well as in Slovak legislation. Th e Supreme 
Court of the Slovak Republic in judgment No 4Sžf/67/2015 of 4 November 2015,85 
warned against abuse of this provision. On the one hand it admitted that no economic 
activity can be excluded per se from reserved contracts to sheltered workshops 
(including construction work). On the other hand, the aim of this legislation is to 
provide contracts to sheltered workshops and the service is in fact performed by 
sub-contractors. 
9. Summary
Environmental damage caused by the extraction of minerals, the exploitation of 
workers and natural resources in food production, and the presence of sweatshops 
in under-privileged countries to meet the ever-increasing demand for consumer 
products in developed nations, is the reality of today’s world. Since it is oft en not 
possible to prosecute violations of human rights within the countries where they 
occur, it is worth considering how, if at all, these violations can be remedied from 
abroad in the countries where the food, clothes or myriad of other goods produced 
are sold to end-users. It is assumed that if the retailers of these products are liable 
for the violations, or they at least bear commercial consequences for the violations, 
such action will force manufacturers to improve the conditions under which those 
products are produced.
Th is paper has analysed how currently existent legal instrument could be used 
in practice in order to deal with the issue at hand. As to the Guiding Principles, it 
may be concluded that even if the second pillar may be interpreted in a way that 
obliges retailers to deal with human rights violations, the Guiding Principles do not 
84 Available at: https://www.uvo.gov.sk/prehlad-rozhodnuti-podla-zakona-c-252006-z-z/docu-
ment/-29 (1.01.2019).
85 Judgments of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic are published online on www.nsud.sk.
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provide legal standing per se. In this regard, EU directives provide more explicit 
rights which might be used, however, their applicability in relation to human rights 
violations would very much depend on interpretation of the relevant provisions. Th e 
same applies to the Slovak acts of law referenced. Th us, even under current legislation 
it is possible, at least in theory, to hold the retailers of goods liable for violations of 
human rights incurred during the course of their production. Public procurement 
rules also provide limited scrutiny over human rights violations although here, the 
duty of contracting authorities to observe labour, environmental and social rules, is 
covered by more explicit provisions.
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